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TOXICOGENOMICS AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION: A REWORKING OF

THE "BARGAIN"?
JOAN

E.

FLAHERTY*

INTRODUCTION

For more than one hundred years, workers' compensation insurance has been
a security system for workers, providing compensation for workplace injuries no
matter what the cause.' The creation of the workers' compensation system was the
result of a "bargain" between workers and employers in which each side gave up
certain legal rights in favor of a system of guaranteed but limited assistance to
workers injured on the job.2 Toxicogenomics threatens to create a new balance of
interests in workers' compensation by providing workers, employers, and insurers
with a powerful tool to predict an individual's future health.3 On one side of the
scales, toxicogenomic technologies could offer employees a scientific test to show
definitively that they were made ill at work.4 Weighing on the opposite side are the
many uses employers and insurers might find in toxicogenomic technologies: the
ability to screen workers for genetic predisposition before employment, 5 access to
greater information in making underwriting and rating decisions, 6 and ultimately
the possibility of using genetic tests to show that a worker's injury was not caused

Copyright © 2009 by Joan E. Flaherty.
* J.D., 2009, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, Md.); B.A., 2000, Rutgers College,
(New Brunswick, N.J.).
1. See Paul Raymond Gurtler, Comment, The Workers' Compensation Principle: A Historical
Abstract of the Nature of Workers' Compensation, 9 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 285, 288, 290 (1989)
(noting that workers' compensation laws originated from nineteenth century Germany, with the goal of
alleviating the burden of socio-economic injuries to industrial workers).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, APPLICATIONS OF TOXICOGENOMIC TECHNOLOGIES TO
PREDICTIVE

TOXICOLOGY

AND

RISK

ASSESSMENT

12

(2007)

[hereinafter

"NRC

Report"]

("Toxicogenomics may lead to information that is more discriminating, predictive, and sensitive than
that currently used to evaluate toxic exposure or predict effects on human health.").
4. See Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 7, 20 (2006)
(arguing that courts have relied upon genetic biomarkers as proof of exposure to toxic chemicals in the
workplace).
5. See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 23, 52-53 (1992) (explaining that employers are permitted to require
potential employees to successfully complete a pre-employment medical examination).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
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by the workplace.7 Whether the historical balance of the workers' compensation
scheme will continue in the age of toxicogenomics will depend on the choices of
workers, employers, insurers, and legislators. Employers and insurers will have to
weigh the costs of using their employees' genetic information, and workers too
must consider their own interests in learning and making use of their genetic
"flaws". 8 Ultimately, legislatures will be called on to decide whether or to what
extent the workers' compensation bargain should be re-worked. 9
This Comment sets forth some of the issues surrounding the use of
toxicogenomic technologies in workers' compensation and recommends that all
parties consider these issues now in order to make sound and fair decisions in the
future when toxicogenomic testing finds its way into the employment setting. This
Comment begins with a history of workers' compensation statutes in Part I,1°
followed by an overview of toxicogenomics in Part II."' In Part III, the Comment
will discuss the potential workplace applications of toxicogenomics, including
employment screening.' 2 Part IV will discuss the application of toxicogenomics to
workers' compensation underwriting, rating, and claims adjusting. 3 Finally, in Part
V the Comment will set out the ethical and policy considerations implicated by the
4
use of toxicogenomics in workers' compensation.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION STATUTES

The enactment of state and federal workers' compensation laws began in the
late nineteenth century as a reaction to an increasingly industrialized economy and
the workplace accidents that followed.15 Prior to the adoption of a statutory scheme,
workers injured while on the job could only find judicial relief for their injuries if
they could prove that their employers' actions amounted to common law
negligence.' 6 Meeting the burden of proof was difficult for many workers because
they had to show that the employer failed to provide a reasonably safe work
environment. 1' Furthermore, employers could fight the workers' claims with three

7. See infra Part IV.B.I.
8. See infra Part 11; see also Susan M. Wolf& Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of
Disability Insurance: Ethics, Law & Policy, J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SuPP. 2), Summer 2007, at 6, 6
(discussing the implications of using genetic information of employees on employers and insurers).
9. See infra Part IV.B.2.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part 111.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 597-600 (3d ed. 2005).

16. Id. at 594.
17. Gurtler, supra note 1, at 286.
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powerful common law defenses. 8 This "unholy trinity" of contributory negligence,
the "fellow servant" doctrine, and assumption of the risk made it nearly impossible
for workers to receive compensation for their injuries, pushing common law courts
to apply judicially created exceptions to the defenses before awarding damages.' 9
Eventually, by the end of the nineteenth century, states began enacting laws
limiting the use of common law defenses by employers. After initial findings of
unconstitutionality, the Supreme Court held state workers' compensation statutes
constitutional, opening the way to more widespread adoption throughout the
20
country.
In enacting statutory workers' compensation schemes, state legislatures
sought to provide medical and financial assistance for injured workers while
shifting the cost of workplace accidents onto the employer, and ultimately onto the
consumer. 21 Workers' compensation statutes had other policy goals as well,
including the creation of safer workplaces and the replacement of costly civil
litigation with timely claims processing.22 In order to accomplish these goals, the
statutory schemes reflected a "bargain" struck between workers and employers, in
which employers accepted liability without fault and waived the common law
defenses, but workers gave up their right to bring civil tort suits in exchange for
guaranteed monetary compensation for their injuries, albeit often at a fixed and
limited amount.23 The hallmark of the bargain was liability without fault, which
removed a worker's burden of proving common law negligence on the part of the
employer.24
Instead of requiring a showing of common law cause-in-fact, workers'
compensation statutes require that injured employees show that their injury
occurred "in the course of' employment 25 and that such injuries also "arise out of'
the employment relationship.2 6 The "arising out of' prong has, in itself, a causation
element as workers must show that the injury was accidental and was causally
18. Id. at 286-87.
19. Id. at 287; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 596.
20. Compare Franklin v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 2 Baltimore City Rep. (1904), and Ives v. South
Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911) (striking down a New York no-fault liability workers'
compensation statute on due process grounds), with Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219
(1917) (upholding a Washington workers' compensation law). For more general discussions of this
trend, see ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 597, 599 and Gurtler, supranote 1,at 293.
21. Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation:Mass Product Torts' Incomplete Incorporation of
Social Welfare Principles,41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 943, 963 (2006); Gurtler, supra note 1, at 293.
22. Gurtler, supra note 1,at 295-96; Ellen R. Peirce & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Workers'
Compensation and OccupationalDisease: A Return to OriginalIntent, 67 OR. L. REV. 649, 653 (1988).
23. Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 22, at 653.
24. See Gifford, supra note 21, at 965-66 (describing the concept of liability without fault in the
context of workers' compensation statutes).
25. This Comment will not discuss the "in the course of' employment prong. For further
discussion, see ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 611-33.
26. Gifford, supra note 21, at 964.
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connected to their job.27 Workers have been successful in proving that their injuries
"arose out of' employment based on the fact that the injuries occurred on the job.28
Notably, in finding compensability, many courts have not required that the
workplace be the only or principal cause of the injury, but only need be one cause
of the injury. 29 As a result, injuries occurring at work that do not on their face
appear to be work related, such as injuries due to acts of nature, are often found by
courts to be compensable. 30 Furthermore, pre-existing diseases or individual
predisposition to an injury that are aggravated by the work environment will often,
though not always, be found to arise out of employment and thus be compensable.3 1
II.

TOXICOGENOMICS GENERALLY

Workers' compensation laws were originally conceived of and enacted in the
late nineteenth century,32 long before the advent of genetic science.33 Recent
toxicogenomic technologies, however, allow scientists to determine if a particular
individual has a greater risk of developing certain occupational diseases because of
his or her genetic makeup.34 Toxicogenomic technologies have several potential
workplace applications, including in workers' compensation insurance.35
Toxicogenomics is the application of genomic technologies to the study of the
effects of chemicals on human health.36 These technologies allow scientists to "peer
into cells" and see how chemicals and other toxic materials affect the cell on a

27. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 651-52.

28. Gifford, supra note 21, at 964.
29. John Dwight Ingram, The Meaning of "Arising Out Of' Employment in Illinois Workers'
CompensationLaw, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 153, 155 (1995).
30. See, e.g., Imperial Trash Serv. v. Dotson, 445 S.E.2d 716 (Va. App. 1994) (holding that
heatstroke was a compensable work-related injury that precipitated the employee's death); Gifford,
supra note 21, at 965. But see Va. Employment Comm'n v. Hale, 598 S.E.2d 327 (Va. App. 2004)
(holding that a worker who was electrocuted when lightning passed through a telephone switchbard was
not eligible for workers' compensation benefits because her job did not increase her risk of being struck
by lightning).
31. See, e.g., Cheshire Toyota/Volvo v. O'Sullivan, 531 A.2d 714 (N.H. 1987) (holding that
employee's fatal heart attack was a compensable work injury despite his history of heart disease);
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 652-54 (detailing the main approaches courts take to determining
whether a heart attack caused by an underlying condition will be considered compensable). But see
Augusta County Sherriffs Dep't v. Overbey, 492 S.E.2d 631 (1997) (holding that the employer
successfully rebutted the statutory presumption that the employee's heart disease was job-related).
32. E.g., Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37 (Eng.).
33. See generally Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining Public Health,
93 CAL. L. REV. 171, 174-76 (2005) (tracing the history of genetic science from the discovery of DNA
in the 1950s to the significant advances that began in the 1990s due to the growing power of computers).
34. See NRC Report, supra note 3, at 182 (discussing employers' use of toxicogenomics to
determine the extent that genetic variability has on occupational diseases).
35. Chris MacDonald & Bryn Williams-Jones, Ethics and Genetics: Susceptibility Testing in the
Workplace, 35 J.Bus. ETHIcs 235,235-36 (2002).
36. NRC Report, supra note 3, at 2.
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molecular level.37 Researchers can also see how differences in gene sequences or
gene mutations affect an individual's susceptibility to chemicals,38 and may result
in far more accurate means of determining the potential effects of toxins on health
than currently available.39
In order to determine the connection between chemicals and genetic
susceptibility, scientists look for biomarkers, or some measurable indication of an
exposure to or effect of a substance on human tissue. 40 Biomarkers work in two
principal ways: to show susceptibility, or to show exposure.41 Susceptibility
42
biomarkers are genetic variations that cause a particular sensitivity to chemicals.
Exposure to the same type and amount of chemical may manifest itself to varying
degrees in different people.43 A susceptibility biomarker essentially modifies the
risk of having a reaction when exposed to a chemical or other trigger. 4 Identifying
which gene variations correlate to a given reaction raises the possibility that
physicians can determine, before exposure, that a person will have a negative
reaction to an agent, and therefore act to avoid such exposure. 45 For example, one
study explored the relationship between variations in a gene responsible for DNA
repair and development of lung cancer in both smokers and non-smokers.46 The
results of the study showed that non-smokers with the mutant genotype had a
greater risk of developing lung cancer than those who had the more common
genotype; whereas smokers with the mutant genotype, who inhale DNA-damaging
carcinogens in smoke, had a 50% reduction in the risk of lung cancer as compared
to smokers with the common genotype.47 The study concluded that "the protective
effect of these genetic variations in heavy smokers may be caused by the

37. Grodsky, supra note 33, at 180.
38. Id. at 181.
39. NRC Report, supranote 3, at 11-12.
40. Grodsky, supra note 33, at 181. The concept of biomarkers is not new to genomics, but has
been refined. The biomarker concept was at use in measuring the level of lead in blood, for example. Id.
at 181.
41. Id. at 183-85. There are also biomarkers of effect or response, which the National Research
Council (NRC) defines as biomarkers that "indicate the response of an organism to an exposure." NRC
Report, supra note 3, at 60. Grodsky defines these as biomarkers of effect, which show changes in cells
in order to predict health effects. Grodsky, supra note 33, at 186. She also notes, however, that the
difference between biomarkers of exposure and biomarkers of effect are not clearly distinguishable. Id.
at 186. Therefore this Comment will discuss only the two principal biomarkers.
42. Grodsky, supra note 33, at 183-84.
43. See NRC Report, supra note 3, at 92 (noting that genetic differences between individuals causes
variation in reactions to different environmental agents).
44. Grodsky, supranote 33, at 184.
45. See NRC Report, supra note 3, at 92 (discussing the association between gene modification and
toxicity in patients taking irinotecan, an anticancer drug, and noting that doctors could screen patients
before chemotherapy to identify potential toxicities).
46. Id. at 95.
47. Id.
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differential increase in activity of these protective genes stimulated by heavy
smoking. '48 These results demonstrate that genetic differences between individuals
can have serious implications for susceptibility to toxins, and that the ultimate
49
effects of toxins on the body may be counterintuitive.
Biomarkers of exposure show that a person has been exposed to a chemical
by detecting a certain amount of that chemical or its derivatives in bodily tissue.5 °
Unlike susceptibility biomarkers, the technology to locate exposure biomarkers is
not as well developed, has not undergone significant human subject research, and
faces many challenges. 5' Toxicogenomic technology has been used in a study that
evaluated the exposure of a group of welders to metallic fumes. 52 The welders were
separated out by smoking status, and non-smokers showed altered gene expression
in eight functional pathways, raising the possibility that the variations were caused
by exposure to workplace fumes.53 In another study, workers exposed to high levels
of benzene showed twenty-nine genes with altered expression. 54 These results may
show genetic indicators of exposure to benzene 55 that could eventually be
developed into tests for an array of occupational toxic exposure.
In order to discover these biomarkers, scientists utilize gene arrays that permit
observation of thousands of genes or parts of genes at the same time to see if they
have been affected by exposure to toxins.56 The potential of such technologies is
significant. Not only do gene arrays speed up the process of studying biomarkers,
but they may also allow scientists to see the effects of multiple chemicals on
genetic material at the same time.57 Given the speed and efficiency of these tests
and the potential for low-cost genotyping in the future, the development of
individual, personalized assessments for susceptibility or exposure may not be too
far off.58 A personalized assessment would allow individuals to understand, based
on observation of their own gene expression, whether they are susceptible to a
given chemical or even if they have unknowingly been exposed to a toxic
substance.59

48. Id.
49. The NRC cautions, however, that "more studies of the combined effects of multiple mutations
are needed.., to understand[] the distribution of genetic and genomic risks in human populations." Id.
50. Grodsky, supra note 33, at 184. The NRC defines biomarker of exposure as "a chemical, its
metabolite, or the product of an interaction between a chemical or some target molecule or cell that is
measured in humans." NRC Report, supra note 3, at 55.
51. NRC Report, supranote 3, at 71.
52. Id. at 70.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 71.
55. Id.
56. Grodsky, supra note 33, at 190.
57. Id. at 190-91.
58. Id. at 197.
59. Id. at 197-98
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In addition to new technologies to test for susceptibility or exposure to
chemicals, there are also approximately a thousand genetic tests available for other
genetic conditions or predispositions, 60 including predictive tests for colon and
breast cancer,6 1 heart disease, and diabetes.62 Such genetic tests are increasingly
commonplace and affordable, and will likely expand to cover predispositions to
more conditions in the coming years. It is not difficult to imagine a day when the
average person would have, along with his or her traditional medical file, a
comprehensive analysis of the likelihood of developing a condition either naturally
64
or because of an interaction with environmental or pharmaceutical chemicals.
It is important to recognize that both toxicogenomic tests and genetic tests for
disease predisposition are, for the most part, not fool-proof indicators of an
eventual outcome.65 Although genetic tests for certain conditions, namely
Huntington's disease, are near certain indicators of eventual disease onset,66 many
other factors may influence whether exposure to a chemical, or genetic
predisposition to natural disease, will actually turn into a symptomatic condition. 7
Diet, lifestyle, age, gender, and previous medical conditions all can contribute to, or
work against, disease onset.68 Diseases produced by exposure to environmental
stimuli may result from both genetic factors and environmental factors, making it
difficult to determine to what degree genetic characteristics caused the condition's
development. 69 Furthermore, toxicogenomic tests themselves are in their infancy
and must still undergo a validation process to test their reliability.70

60. Geneforum, What Kinds of Genetic Tests Are Available?, http://www.geneforum.org/
geneticjtesting-a.resource__guide for- con (last visited Nov. 29, 2009).
61. Francis S. Collins, Director, Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., A Brief Primer on Genetic
Testing at the World Economic Forum (Jan. 24, 2003), http://www.genome.gov/10506784.
62. See Univ. of Wash., Seattle, GeneTests: Laboratory Directory, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
sites/GeneTests/lab?db=GeneTests (last visited Nov. 29, 2009) (for a searchable database of currently
available genetic tests).
63. See generally Collins, supra note 61 (noting the likelihood of expanded testing in the coming
years); see also Univ. of Wash., Seattle, GeneTests: Gene Reviews, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
sites/GeneTests/review?db=GeneTests (last visited Nov. 29, 2009) (for a searchable database of current
research on potential genetic tests).
64. See generally Office of Biological & Envtl. Research, U.S. Dep't of Energy,
Pharmacogenomics: Medicine and the New Genetics, http://www.oml.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/medicine/pharma.shtml (last visited Nov. 29, 2009) (discussing the possibility that
pharmacogenomics may identify and decrease adverse drug reactions in individuals and remove the
trial-and-error method of prescribing pharmaceuticals).
65. MacDonald & Williams-Jones, supra note 35, at 237.
66. HUNTINGTON'S DISEASE SOC'Y OF AM., GENETIC TESTING FOR HUNTINGTON'S DISEASE

(1996), availableat http://www.lkwdpl.org/hdsa/hdtest.htm.
67. Grodsky, supra note 33, at 188-89.
68. Id. at 188.
69. Id. at 188-89.
70. See NRC Report, supra note 3, at 135 (explaining that the utility of toxicogenomic technologies
depends on their reliability).
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POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF TOXICOGENOMICS TO THE WORKPLACE

When the day arrives that every worker carries in his or her hand a prediction
of the effect certain substances might have on his or her health, it will no doubt
empower both workers and employers to make more informed employment
decisions. As already mentioned, new toxicogenomic technologies hold the
promise of pinpointing when certain individuals might have a biological response
to a particular chemical. 7' Reliable tests would likely have many salutary effects:
workers would have the opportunity to avoid exposure to chemicals in order to
preserve their health, employers could redesign manufacturing processes in order to
eliminate unnecessary toxins in the workplace and provide protective equipment to
prevent exposure, doctors could anticipate negative effects in workers and prepare a
treatment plan in advance.72 However, knowledge of such risk factors in the
employee population could bring with it potential discriminatory uses on the part of
employers.73
Many employers undoubtedly would like to know if their workers are
susceptible to developing a work-related disease even before making a hiring
decision. 74 Eliminating at-risk workers would likely lower employer health
insurance and workers' compensation premiums.75 Furthermore, employers are
required under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 76 to maintain a workplace
free of dangers that are likely to cause serious injury to employees.77 Knowing in
advance the genetic risks their employees face would give employers a head start in
making necessary workplace modifications.78 In fact, employers already use a
variety of tests in making hiring decisions, including medical examinations and

71. Grodsky, supranote 33, at 196-98.
72. See generally NRC Report, supra note 3, at 59-151 (discussing the potential applications and
validation of toxicogenomics).
73. See generally Rothstein, supra note 5, at 25-30 (describing discriminatory uses of genetic
information by employers).
74. See Joanne L. Hustead & Janlori Goldman, Genetics and Privacy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 285,
293-95 (2002) (stating that most large employers require new hires to take medical exams and twenty
percent of major U.S. firms gather an employee's family medical history, which allows firms to make
decisions based on risk of disease).
75. See Susannah Carr, Invisible Actors: Genetic Testing and Genetic Discrimination in the
Workplace, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (stating that employers have a "strong
economic incentive to screen out" workers perceived as high cost healthcare users).
76. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-667 (2006).
77. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 491.
78. It is not clear that OSHA requires or allows employers to consider genetic factors to meet
OSHA standards. See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetics and the Work Force of the Next Hundred Years,
2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 371, 400 (indicating that OSHA lacks specific standards regarding genetic
testing).
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drug screening.7 9 Pre-placement medical exams are widely used today, especially in
industrial workplaces.8 °
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination in hiring
based on medical exams or medical inquiries. 81 As a result, under the ADA, an
employer cannot require a medical exam or inquire into an individual's genetic
status before making a conditional offer of employment. 82 An employer also would
be unable to access an applicant's personalized assessment of his or her genetic
predisposition to disease or interaction with chemicals before extending a job
offer.

3

The ADA does permit employers to condition an offer of employment on the
successful completion of a medical exam.84 It is important to note that, although
this provision of the ADA would give an employer access to an employee's
previously ascertained genetic status and to conduct genetic testing,85 an employer
would still violate the ADA if it then withdrew an offer of employment based on
the worker's genetic status alone. 86 The employer may, however, use the results of
the medical exam, including information about genetic predispositions, to deny
employment if that genetic information reveals that the worker cannot perform
essential job duties.87 For example, a worker may have a genetic predisposition to a
given chemical that will cause him or her to lose consciousness. If the worker's job
duties require interaction with that chemical, the employer could argue that he or

79. Id. at 382.
80. Rothstein, supranote 5, at 52-53; Daniel Schlein, New Frontiersfor Genetic Privacy Law: The
Genetic Information NondiscriminationAct of 2008, 19 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 311, 316 (2009)
(noting that a 2001 survey from the American Management Association revealed that sixty-eight percent
of major American firms required medical examinations for new hires, current employees, or both).
81. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006).
82. Id. § 102(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (prohibiting an employer from discriminating against an employee
by asking an applicant whether the applicant has a disability, except for "inquiries into the ability of an
applicant to perform job-related functions"); see also Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic
Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protectionsfor a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1497, 1514
(2002) (noting that the ADA would prohibit an employer's inquiry into an applicant's genetic
information prior to making an offer).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2).
85. See Rothstein, supra note 78, at 386 (noting that the ADA permits employers to require
individuals to sign a release authorizing the disclosure of all medical information in the files of the
individual's treating physicians).
86. Schlein, supra note 80, at 320 (noting that the EEOC would conclude that an employer treated
an employee as "substantially limited in a major life activity," thus violating the ADA, if the employer
withdraws a job offer based on knowledge of the employee's genetic profile).
87. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 55 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(b)(6), 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6)).
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she cannot perform the basic job functions based on the likelihood of losing
88
consciousness.
An employer may also legally screen out an employee under the "direct
threat" provision of the ADA. 89 The statute permits an employer to refuse to hire an
individual if it can show that the person presently poses a direct threat to the
"health or safety of others" in the workplace. 90 EEOC regulations, 9' upheld by the
Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,92 also allow an
employer to refuse to hire a person posing a direct threat to his or her own health.93
In order to qualify as a "direct threat," the individual must create a "significant risk
of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. 94 An individualized
assessment of the person's condition, relying on current medical knowledge, is
required in determining if the individual in fact poses a threat.95
An employer may find a defense in the "direct threat" provision if it refuses to
hire an employee following a pre-placement medical exam that revealed a
susceptibility to a workplace chemical.96 An employer could argue, using a
scientifically accepted toxicogenomic test, that the applicant's genetic status posed
a "significant risk" of "substantial harm" to the employee's own health.97 Though a
genetic test is not a fool-proof indicator of a future reaction, a court could find that
having a susceptibility biomarker for a workplace chemical amounts to a
"substantial risk" of a negative reaction upon exposure. 9 ' Furthermore, the
employer could argue that a reasonable accommodation for that individual is not
feasible because any position in the workplace would expose the individual to
interaction with the chemical. 99 A defense under the "direct threat" provision has

88. See
PDRHealth,
Complete
Diseases
and
Health
Conditions
Index
A-Z,
http://www.pdrhealth.com/disease/disease-a-z.aspx?letter-L
(follow
"Loss of Consciousness"
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 29, 2009) (explaining how certain chemicals can cause loss of
consciousness).
89. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 103(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b). This provision

operates as a defense if an employer is charged with violation of the ADA.
90. Id. § 101(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).

91. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r), .15(b)(2) (2008).
92. 536 U.S. 73, 76-77 (2002).
93. Id. at 76.
94. 29C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).

95. Id.
96. See Chevron, 536 U.S. at 76-79 (explaining that an employer may rightfully terminate an
employee based on that employee's vulnerability to a chemical within the workplace).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
98. See, e.g., Chevron, 536 U.S. at 76-79 (permitted termination based only on an employee's

vulnerability to workplace chemicals).
99. THE

LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL

JUSTICE:

THEORIES

AND

PROCEDURES

TO

ADDRESS

DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 722 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., American Bar Association 2d ed.) (2008)
(noting that employers are relieved of their obligation to accommodate disabled individuals "if the
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historically been hard to prove,100 however, and the use of recently developed
toxicogenomic technologies to substantiate such a claim could meet a certain
degree ofjudicial resistance. 1 '
It is unlikely, however, that the "direct threat" provision or any other ADA
protection would apply to individuals who have a susceptibility biomarker for a
workplace chemical.10 2 The Supreme Court has limited the definition of a disability
qualifying an individual for ADA protection to a presently-existing physical or
mental impairment, not a condition that could "potentially or hypothetically" limit
a major life activity.' 0 3 Therefore, an individual with a heightened risk for
developing an illness in the workplace, but suffering no current symptoms, would
not be protected by ADA at all. 10 4 As a result, an employer legally could exclude an
individual from employment based on a pre-placement medical exam that reveals
an individual's genetic predisposition.'0 5
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 makes it illegal, with
limited exceptions, for an employer to even request genetic information about an
employee. 10 6 The new law allows employers to collect genetic information about
employees for the limited purpose of monitoring the effects of workplace toxins on
employee health, but would not permit the employer (other than the employer's
health care professionals) to see the individual results of such tests. 10 7 Although this
provision purports to protect an individual employee by limiting the use of genetic
information by his employer, the results of genetic tests could still become part of
the employee's medical records.' 0 8 Currently there is no system in place to separate

accommodations would result in undue hardship or if the accommodation would not enable the
employee to perform the essential functions of the position.").
100. See Rothstein, supra note 5, at 72.
101. Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 L. & INEQUALITY
429, 445 (2007) ("[Clourts have construed the reasonable accommodation requirement in the ADA as
mandating a much greater level of effort and expense on the part of employers than is required by the
comparable language applicable to religious discrimination under Title VII.").
102. Kim, supra note 83, at 1514.
103. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194-95 (2002); Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
104. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 (noting that a "disability" under the ADA exists only where an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, "not where it 'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be
substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.").
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006) (permitting employers to conduct pre-employment medical
examinations and tocondition offers for employment on the results of such examinations).
106. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 202(b), 122 Stat.
907 (2008).
107. Id.
108. Patricia Alten, Note, GINA: A Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Solution in Search of a
Problem, 61 FLA. L. REV. 379, 389 (2009).
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out genetic information from other health information. 10 9 Therefore, even if
nondisclosure of genetic information were required by law, as a practical matter
nondisclosure would be difficult when many patient records are paper-based files
containing a lifetime of records for a variety of medical conditions." 0 Furthermore,
disclosure of medical records-which may include genetic test results---could be
compelled in workers' compensation suits.11 ' How the new law affects the ADA
allowance for pre-placement medical exams, where the individual is not yet an
employee, is not clear. 1 2 In addition to the recent federal legislation, about twothirds of the states have also enacted legislation prohibiting the request or
3
collection of genetic information in making hiring decisions."l
Beyond legal hurdles there are other reasons why an employer may choose
not to engage in predictive genetic testing of potential employees. As noted above,
toxicogenomic technologies are still in their developmental stages.1 4 The results of

109. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, Compelled Disclosure of Health
Information, 295 JAMA 2882, 2882 (2006) (indicating that paper-based records may combine both
routine medical data with sensitive information, such as genetic test results).
110. Id. Medical records "may intermingle routine clinical data with sensitive information such as
mental health, genetic test results, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual history, history of abortions and
other reproductive matters, domestic violence, and drug and alcohol abuse." Id. Furthermore, under
GINA, it is not unlawful for an employer to inadvertently gain access to information about an
employee's family medical history. Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 202(b)(1), 122 Stat. at 907 (2008). The
EEOC's proposed regulations extend GINA's carve-out for inadvertent acquisition specifically to
genetic information about the employee or his family. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 9066, 9068 (proposed March 2, 2009). The proposed regulations provide several
examples of how an employer could inadvertently-and therefore legally-obtain an employee's
genetic information. Id. GINA also does not apply to the acquisition of genetic information during an
examination made for a purpose other than determining fitness for a particular job, and therefore would
not apply to medical examinations made for the purpose of settling workers' compensation claims. Id.
I 11. Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 109, at 2883; see also infra Part IV (discussing genetic testing
in workers' compensation claims). GINA does not apply to the use of genetic information in processing
and litigating workers' compensation claims. See Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in ContemporaryEthics:
GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHics 837, 837 (2008)
(noting that GINA "prohibits discrimination in employment and heath insurance" but "does not apply to
life insurance, disability insurance, long-term care insurance, or other potential uses of genetic
information").
112. In fact, GINA may have no effect upon the collection of genetic information as part of a preplacement medical exam that is lawful under the ADA. Rothstein, supra note 11l, at 838 ("GINA does
not affect a key provision of the [ADA], under which an employer may, after a conditional offer of
employment, lawfully require an individual to sign an authorization to disclose all of his or her health
records to the employer.").
113. NRC Report, supra note 3, at 181. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.974 (West 2007)
(prohibiting employers from requiring the production of genetic information as a condition of
employment). For a comprehensive survey of state genetic anti-discrimination laws, see Nat'l
Conference of State Legislatures, Genetic Employment Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/
Health/GeneticEmploymentLaws/tabid/1 4280/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
114. NRC Report, supra note 3, at 135.
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these tests are at times counterintuitive l and misunderstood by health care
professionals and the public alike."l 6 Furthermore, locating a susceptibility
biomarker in an individual's genetic material shows only that the individual has an
increased likelihood, though not a certainty, of an adverse reaction.'
Based on current statutes, employers are restricted in their use of genetic
information to screen out employees who might be a liability to the employer in the
future. 1 8 However, even in circumstances where pre-placement screening would
violate the law, employers may gain access to workers' genetic information for
other purposes, such as disputing workers' compensation claims.' 19
IV. APPLICATION

OF TOXICOGENOMIC TECHNOLOGIES TO WORKERS'
COMPENSATION INSURANCE

Toxicogenomic technologies potentially could be applied in the arena of
workers' compensation insurance. 120 Workers' compensation coverage is currently
compulsory for employers in nearly every state.'12 Because workers' compensation
insurance provides relief for workplace accidents or disease, 2 2 the ability to predict
susceptibility or exposure to such a disease could be of great use to insurers in
underwriting policies and to employers in defending against workers'
compensation claims. 123
A. Toxicogenomics in Workers' Compensation Underwritingand Rating
Most state workers' compensation systems allow employers to self-insure (to
cover all the costs of workplace injuries and subsequent litigation) or to purchase

115. See id. at 95 (noting that counterintuitive findings are likely to emerge from studying geneenvironment interactions).
116. Wolf& Kahn, supra note 8, at 8.
117. See Grodsky, supra note 33, at 184 (noting that a susceptibility gene is "neither necessary nor
sufficient to cause disease" because the genes "modify risk").
118. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (limiting the use of medical tests and screenings before
hiring employees).
119. See Kim, supra note 83, at 1510 (noting that employers can access genetic information that is
part of the employee's medical file).
120. See Jennifer Girod & Andrew R. Klein, PersonalizedMedicine and Toxic Exposure, 9 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 163, 174 (2009) (quoting Mark Hansen, DNA Poised to Show Its Civil Side: After
Changing Criminal Law, Tests Are Ready for Workers' Comp, Toxic Tort Cases, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2008,
at 18, 19, availableat http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/dna-poised-to show-its-civil-side/
(discussing the use of toxicogenomics dozens of California workers' compensation cases)).
121. Ishita Sengupta & Virginia Reno, Recent Trends in Workers' Compensation, SOC. SECURITY
BULL., Aug. 2007, at 17, 18 (2007), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v67n1/
v67nlp17.pdf ("Every state except Texas requires employers to provide workers' compensation
coverage.").
122. E.g., id. at 18-19.
123. See generally Girod & Klein, supra note 120, at 172 (discussing possible uses of information
regarding disease susceptibility, including by employers defending against employee lawsuits).
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coverage, either through a state operated system or from a private insurer.'2 4 For
employers that purchase insurance, each employer's total workforce is separated
into industrial classes and assigned a rate. 125 These initial 126class rates are stateregulated, and often require advance approval to be changed.
To allow room for competition, states permit insurers to engage in experience
rating, a process by which insurers adjust an employer's overall coverage rate
either up or down based on its previous claims experience, usually over the
preceding three years. 127 An employer that has filed many claims in the past three
years is more likely to have its rate increase; an employer that has a relatively short
claims history will probably get a premium discount, and pay less than a
comparable employer that filed more claims. 28 Under the experience rating system,
incentive to keep claims, and therefore
employers clearly have an economic
29
minimum.
a
to
injuries,
workplace
Toxicogenomics might factor into workers' compensation insurance rating in
two ways. On the one hand, employers that understand how experience rating
works will naturally want to minimize the number of people they hire who are
likely to suffer a workplace illness and file a claim. 130 Employers in industries
where many potentially toxic substances are used will likely expand the use of
conditional offers of employment subject to medical exams. 13 ' As noted above, the
ADA most likely would not protect individuals who discover a genetic
predisposition to workplace illness through a pre-placement physical exam. 32 If
such an individual did have an existing condition that would qualify as a disability
under the ADA, an employer could still try to argue that due to a genetic condition
the worker currently could not perform a basic job function, such as a task
requiring close interaction with a chemical. 33 Alternatively, an employer could

124. Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistence of
OccupationalInjuries, 31 Hous. L. REv. 119, 189 (1994).
125. Id. at 189-90.
126. Id. at 190.
127. Id. at 192-93.
128. Id.
129. In fact, experience rating has been viewed as an incentive to prevent injury by making
workplaces safer. See id. at 193.
130. See Keith N. Hylton & Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers'
Compensation, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 109, 154 (1992) (explaining that employers that reduce the number
of injury claims without investing in new equipment, training, and supervision can enjoy lower
premiums and improve their rating without incurring new costs).
131. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text (showing that while rational to precondition
employment offers, any prerequisite to an employment offer based on a medical exam must fall into
either the category of direct threat, or be for a legitimate business purpose).
132. See supra Part Ill.
133. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 §101(3), 42 U.S.C. §12111(3) (2006) (permitting
employers to refuse to hire individuals that presently pose a direct threat to the "health or safety of
others" in the workplace).
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also engage in screening of workers and, if sued for discrimination under the ADA,
could invoke the "direct threat" defense. 134 Due to the limited application of the
ADA to individuals with biomarkers of susceptibility, 13 and the defenses for
employers in cases where individuals do qualify for ADA protection, 136 an
employer could essentially screen out an entire class of workers who have a higher
137
risk of contracting a workplace disease and filing a claim for compensation.
Workers' compensation carriers could also require policyholders to gather
138
genetic information about their employees before agreeing to provide coverage.
Currently there is no legislation preventing the use of genetic information in
workers' compensation or other disability underwriting, unlike in health
insurance. 139 Many states have enacted genetic privacy laws that would prohibit an
employer from disclosing genetic information to a workers' compensation carrier
without the employee's consent. 14 However, giving such consent could be made a
condition of employment as disclosure, in itself, would not be discrimination under
the ADA.'14 Workers, especially in the face of a declining number of industrial
42
jobs, would have little bargaining power to refuse to consent to such a request.1
Furthermore, workers' compensation carriers have no obligation to continue to
write policies in any given state. Carriers likely would be highly resistant to any

134. An employer would only have to use the direct threat defense if the employee in question first
had an ADA-qualifying disability. Id.
135. See Rothstein, supra note 11l, at 839 (noting that the ADA does not address biomarkers).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
137. See id. (allowing a covered employer to, at its discretion, screen out individuals from
employment as long as the screening is job-related and consistent with business necessity).
138. NAT'L COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INS., BASIC MANUAL FOR WORKERS COMPENSATION AND
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY INSURANCE 66 (2001) (allowing insurance administrators to gather any
information they demonstrate is necessary to process employers' applications to determine eligibility).
139. See Wolf & Kahn, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that some states limit health insurers' access to
genetic information).
140. For a detailed description of state health privacy laws, see JOY PRITTS ET AL., THE STATE OF
HEALTH PRIVACY: A SURVEY OF STATE HEALTH PRIVACY STATUTES (2d ed. 2002).
141. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-

inquiries.html (explaining that employers are permitted to make disability-related inquiries and carry out
medical examinations on potential employees, so long as the inquiries are made for all entering
employees). Further, GINA likely has no effect upon such a disclosure requirement by employers. See
generally Rothstein, supranote Ill (discussing the scope of GINA).
142. See generally CTR. FOR ECON. DEV., UNIV. OF WIS.-MILWAUKEE, CURBING INDUSTRIAL

DECLINE OR THWARTING REDEVELOPMENT? AN EVALUATION OF CHICAGO'S CLYBOURN CORRIDOR,
GOOSE ISLAND, AND ELSTON CORRIDOR PLANNED MANUFACTURING DISTRICTS (2005), available at
http://www4.uwm.edu/ced/publications/pmdstudyl .pdf (analyzing the decline of manufacturing jobs and
employers in Chicago); Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the
Workplace, 17 AM. J. L. & MED. 75, 104 (1991) (commenting that employees susceptible to disease may
be forced to pursue private insurance in some instances when their genetic information is monitored in
the workplace).
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legislative attempt to prevent collection of genetic information, and could
theoretically threaten to cease providing coverage in a state should such legislation
be enacted.
B. Toxicogenomics and Workers' Compensation Claims
To establish the compensability of a work-related injury, an employee need
not prove that the employer was at fault in causing the injury, but only that the
injury arose out of employment.143 However, an employer may be able to escape
liability if it can offer rebuttal proof that the injury was not caused by the
workplace but by a genetic predisposition. 144 Consequently, toxicogenomic tests for
biomarkers of exposure could be used by both employer and employee to show
145
either that an exposure did or did not occur.
1. The Model of Toxic Tort Litigation
The past and potential use of toxicogenomic technologies in toxic tort
litigation provides a helpful example of how biomarkers may be used in workers'
compensation claims disputes.146 Although workers' compensation statutes do not
require the same proof of causation as common law torts, 147 tort litigation is still a
helpful indicator of the uses of toxicogenomics. 148 Some state workers'
compensation statutes, as described below, allow an employer to escape liability if
it can demonstrate that some factor other than work substantially caused the
worker's injuries.

49

143. See generally tngram, supra note 29 (explaining the requirement that workers' compensation
injuries "arise out of" the worker's employment).
144. See Gifford, supra note 21, at 96 (noting that the employer's conduct must be a cause of the
worker's injuries in any workers' compensation claim).
145. See Marchant, supra note 4, at 22 ("[G]ene expression microarrays have tremendous potential
to provide objective, individualized data on exposure, which both plaintiffs and defendants will be able
to use in appropriate cases.").
146. See, e.g., id. at 20-21 (citing In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 622 (3d Cir. 1999))
("[G]enetic markers can, in principle, be used to demonstrate and quantify exposure to a toxic agent, but
the temporal dimensions of when the exposure occurred and when the exposure biomarkers were
assayed will be critical to the admissibility of such evidence."); id. at 10-12 (citing Easter v. Aventis
Pasteur, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 576 (E.D. Tex. 2005)) (examining the potential for genetic susceptibility
claims to circumvent causation barriers to recovery).
147. Gifford, supra note 21, at 965-66 ("The workers' compensation system thus allows the injured
worker to receive benefits without satisfying any requirement of proof as a causal connection between a
particular injurer and a particular victim comparable to that traditionally required by the common law of
torts.").
148. See Marchant, supra note 4, at 12-13 (discussing litigation in which defendants have sought
genetic testing of plaintiffs "for the purpose of showing potential alternative causes of the claimants'
condition").
149. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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In the past plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation have used genetic susceptibility
studies to try to prove causation. 150 In some of these cases, the genetic data did not
successfully prove causation because the data were from a generalized study and
were not specific to the plaintiffs own genetic susceptibility to the toxin.15' In
cases where the data were plaintiff-specific, they in fact showed a lack of
susceptibility. 5 2 Therefore individualized susceptibility biomarkers have already
been used in toxic tort litigation to both prove (though unsuccessfully) and disprove
causation. 153
Toxicogenomics may also be used in toxic tort litigation to show exposure to
chemical toxins.1 54 Measuring exposure to a chemical substance by traditional
testing is often difficult, especially when the plaintiff does not realize they have
been exposed until long after the incident of exposure.1 55 Biomarkers of exposure
could give plaintiffs the measurable proof of exposure required by courts. 56 In the
same way, biomarkers of exposure could be used by injured employees to show
that they were exposed to a chemical specific to the workplace, and therefore
establish that their injury arose out of employment. 57 Alternatively, an employer
could utilize such technology. 58 If a genetic test found no exposure to a chemical,
or exposure only to a substance not contained in the workplace, the employer
would have further proof that the injury did not arise out of the employment
59
relationship.
Biomarkers of exposure could also help workers who suffer from latent onset
diseases that were caused by work activity.' 60 In toxic torts, plaintiffs can sue based

150. Marchant, supra note 4, at 10-11 (discussing cases where plaintiffs sought to prove causation
by reliance on genetic susceptibility to certain substances, including: silicone, in a breast implant suit;
ionizing radiation, in a suit brought by an individual with thyroid cancer; and mercury, in a claim
involving autism allegedly caused by a chemical preservative in vaccines).
151. Id. at 11.
152. Id. (citing Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 576 (E.D. Tex. 2005)).
153. Id.at 10-11.
154. Id.at 19-20.
155. Id. at20.
156. See Marchant, supra note 4, at 20 (describing the advantages and disadvantages of using
biomarkers to prove exposure).
157. See id. at 20-21 (quoting In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d at 690) ("The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit validated the general approach of using such biomarkers to prove exposure, holding that
such use of genetic markers 'is an accepted method, not simply for determining if the subject of the
analysis was irradiated, but also for estimating radiation dose to the individual.").
158. Girod & Klein, supra note 120, at 174; Tamar Lewin, Commission Sues Railroad to End
Genetic Testing in Work Injury Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at A 10 (discussing the use of genetic
testing by a railroad company for workers' compensation purposes).
159. See Hansen, supra note 120 (indicating some California workers' compensation cases have
been dropped after biomarker tests established that a claimant had not been injured by workplace
chemical exposure as alleged).
160. Cf Marchant, supra note 4, at 27-30 (discussing the use of biomarkers as they relate to
plaintiffs' recovery for exposure and latent onset of disease in toxic tort cases generally).
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16 1
on exposure to a toxin even if they have yet to manifest symptoms of disease.
Use of toxicogenomic technologies in those cases might allow plaintiffs to make a
showing of the prerequisite conditions to state a claim in latent risk. 1 62 For
example, courts may require a plaintiff in such a case to show a present injury,
which is difficult to do if no symptoms are present. 163 A positive test for exposure
may suffice to support a latent risk claim.' 64 Likewise, a test that proves exposure
to a chemical agent may help an employee show that a condition is work-related
165
even if the condition develops well after exposure or over a long period of time.

Traditionally some courts would deny workers' compensation coverage for such
66
latent onset conditions. 1
2. State Statutory Modifications to the "ArisingOut Of" Prong
Workers' compensation statutes were initially enacted at a time when most
workplace injuries were the result of a sudden accident with a piece of
machinery. 167 Since that time, however, many workers' compensation claims are
for injuries without one clearly defined cause, that develop over a long period of
time, or whose work-relatedness is difficult to measure. 168 Some of the most
difficult cases in which to determine the work-relatedness of an injury are those for
conditions to which the employee was predisposed but which may have been
aggravated by working conditions. 169 These cases represent an opportunity to use
toxicogenomic technologies to either establish or refute compensability by
170
employers, insurance companies, and employees.

161. Id. at 27.
162. Id. at 28-29.
163. Id. at 28.
164. See id. at 29 (noting that an individual or class must have been exposed to a hazardous agent in
toxic tort suits involving latent risks).
165. See generally Kelly Corbett, Comment, Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome: Occupational
Disease or Work-Related Accident?, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 395, 406 (1997) (discussing problems
of latency in workers' compensation claims).
166. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 656 (explaining that states that regularly award
benefits to workers in such cases "may deny coverage in close cases," such as those involving
"individuals who are unable to demonstrate clear employment-related causal connections or who sustain
conditions that do not develop at identifiable times").
167. Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform", 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 767 (1998).
168. See generally ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 661-69 (discussing the scope of
occupational disease).
169. See Marchant, supra note 4 at 963 (noting employers in workers' compensation claims
generally only prevail where they can show a "pre-existing genetic condition or predisposition was the
exclusive cause of the disability, and could have occurred independent of any workplace exposure").
170. See, e.g., Nigel Hawkes, DNA Test that Could Quickly Solve Thousands of Sick Workers'
Claims, THE TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/
article2469488.ece (exploring the use of DNA testing in civil litigation); Jeremy Smerd, DNA
Technology May Curb Bogus Disability Claims, Workforce Management, Sept. 10, 2007, at 8, available
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Over the past half century, legislatures have generally expanded statutory
coverage for workplace accidents in order to compensate more workers.17 1 In many
states, a worker need only show that the workplace was one cause of an injury, but
not necessarily the principal cause. 72 For example, in Alabama, to be compensated
a worker must show that his job exposed him to a danger "materially in excess of
' 73
that danger to which all persons are ordinarily exposed in their everyday lives."'
Under this standard, an Alabama court found a worker's back injury fully
compensable even when multiple doctors testified that the worker had a "genetic
predisposition" or "genetic marker" for ankylosing spondylitis, an arthritic
condition.1 74 Furthermore, many courts will find compensability in such cases
because aggravation of a pre-existing condition is a foreseeable result of work
duties. 7 5 Under these standards, the use of susceptibility biomarkers by an
employer to refute liability would likely have little effect: even if a worker was
susceptible to injury, ultimately it was the workplace exposure or accident that
caused the injury. 176 As one court noted, "where employment aggravates or
combines with a latent disease ... to produce a disability, the pre-existing disability
does not disqualify the employee's claim ... if the employee was able to perform
his job duties before the injury."' 7 7 On the other hand, an injured worker could
utilize a biomarker of exposure to show that he had been exposed to a workplace
chemical, and thus rule out non-work causes of the condition. 78
Some states have enacted statutory provisions that require employees to show
more definitively that their job caused their injury. 179 South Dakota requires that
"the employment or employment related injury is and remains a major contributing
cause of the disability.., or need for treatment" for a pre-existing condition to be

at http://www.workforce.com/section/OO/article/25/12/44-printer.html (discussing the possibility of
using genetic testing to cut down on frivolous disability claims in the workplace).
171. Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, Improving Workplace Safety: Standardsor Insurance?,
14 REGULATION 64, 67 (1991), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regvl4n4/regl4n4kniesner.html ("Workers' compensation benefits rose rapidly during the 1970s and early 1980s under a
threat of federal preemption of state systems.").
172. See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 29, at 156-59 (discussing the various approaches taken to
determine whether an injury arises out of employment).
173. Tee Jays Mfg. Co. v. Stults, 723 So.2d 684, 686 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
174. Brock & Blevins, Inc. v. Cagle, 775 So.2d 824, 827-29 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
175. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supranote 15, at 648.

176. See infra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
177. Brock & Blevins, 775 So.2d at 828 n.2 (citing Cagle v. Brock & Blevins, Inc., 723 So.2d 65, 68
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998)).
178. See Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic Information and the Workplace: Legislative Approaches
and Policy Challenges, 275 SCIENCE 1755 (1997) (discussing the purpose of 1991 Wisconsin legislation
promoting employee genetic testing for determining levels of exposure to toxic chemicals in the
workplace).
179. See infra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
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compensable. 180 Montana only finds compensability for cardiovascular, pulmonary,
and respiratory diseases if the workplace accident is the primary cause of the
condition, defining primary cause as being "responsible for more than 50% of the
physical condition."'' s Arkansas measures compensability by the specificity of the
accident, requiring that the accident that causes the injury be "a specific
incident. . . [that] is identifiable by time and place of occurrence." 182
Under these statutes, where a more substantial link between the injury and the
workplace is required, toxicogenomics might play a central role in deciding
compensability. 8 3 In fact, genetic predispositions are already used in workers'
compensation cases. 184 For example, the Supreme Court of South Dakota denied
compensation for a worker's back injury when a physician's testimony failed to
establish that his work duties, rather than the worker's pre-existing genetic
condition, were the "major contributing cause" of his injury.' 8 This case
demonstrates how the injection of even less precise, non-toxicogenomic genetic
data into physician testimony can create enough doubt about the work connection
of an injury to defeat compensability; an individualized test result showing a
susceptibility biomarker or a disease predisposition would likely have the same or
greater effect.1

86

Toxicogenomic tests are a developing technology; it remains to be seen how
courts will react to their use in showing a work origin of injury or disease. Even if
courts are willing to rely on these tests on an evidentiary basis, genetic tests may be
187
only selectively accessible for workers' compensation claims adjudication.
Currently at least three states' legislative codes permit the use of genetic tests in
investigating workers' compensation claims, but require the written and informed
consent of the employee.' 8 8 In these states the use of susceptibility or exposure
biomarkers likely would be limited to use by a plaintiff to affirmatively show the
injury arose out of employment. 189 Under these statutes, a defendant-employer or

180. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-1-1(7)(b) (2007) (emphasis added).
181. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(5)(a)-(b) (2007).
182. ARK. CODE ANN. § I I-9-102(4)(A)(i) (2002).
183. See generally NRC Report, supra note 3, at 12 (noting that toxicogenomics can provide
sensitive, predictive information).
184. See infra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
185. Hom v. Dakota Pork, 709 N.W.2d 38, 44-45 (S.D. 2006).
186. See NRC Report, supra note 3, at 12 (noting the possible use of toxicogenomics in genetic risk
assessment).
187. See infra notes 188-192 and accompanying text (discussing genetics in workers' compensation
claims).
188. IOWA CODE § 729.6(7)(a) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:3(IV)(a) (2007); Wis. STAT.
§ 111.372(4)(a) (2006).
189. E.g., IOWA CODE § 729.6(7)(a) (permitting genetic testing by employees to determine the
employee's "level of exposure to potentially toxic chemicals or potentially toxic substances in the
workplace...").

2009]

TOXICOGENOMICS AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION

insurance company could probably not even make a request for a genetic test from
the employee.' 90 Given the number of states that have already enacted genetic
privacy and nondiscrimination statutes, 91' it is not unreasonable to think that many
more states may adopt similar provisions to their workers' compensation statutes,
thus closing off the possibilities for using toxicogenomic technologies in workers'
92
compensation disputes.
On the other hand, some states have taken a more lenient approach to the use
of genetic tests in adjudicating workers' compensation claims.' 93 South Carolina
may be the most permissive, exempting workers' compensation insurance
completely from a health insurance non-discrimination provision that prohibits the
exclusion of an individual from coverage based on his or her genetic
information. 194 Utah takes a moderate approach, allowing an employer to seek a
court order compelling a genetic test when the employee has placed his or her
health at issue, which a worker does when filing a workers' compensation claim.' 95
Although the potential uses of genetic information in claims decisions are
significant, the ability to use genetic information in the workers' compensation
context is not assured based on current law.
V. TOXICOGENOMICS AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION: POLICY AND
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The use of toxicogenomic technologies in workers' compensation insurance
raises many of the same ethical and policy issues that must be considered anytime
an individual's genetic information is revealed. 196 Privacy, confidentiality, potential
discrimination, and the rights of individuals and their relatives to not know their

190. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 111.372(1) (allowing genetic testing upon the request of the employee
only).
Laws,
Genetic
Privacy
State
Legislatures,
of
Nat'l
Conference
191. See
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14287 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (genetic privacy laws); Nat'l
Conference of State Legislatures, Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14374 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (nondiscrimination laws);
Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Genetic Nondiscrimination Enforcement Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14279 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (insurance laws relating to
genetics).
192. See generally Kylie B. Crawford, Lifeguard on Duty: Congress Patrols the Gene Pool, Sept.
14, 2007, http://www.hrhero.comIhl/091407-lead-genetics.shtml (suggesting that employers consider
developing new policies to comply with the increased regulation of genetic information use in the
workplace).
193. See generally Kathryn J. Sedo, Workers' Compensation, Social Security Disability, SSI, and
Genetic Testing, J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SUPP. 2), Summer 2007, at 74 (discussing the lack of genetic
privacy protections in workers' compensation laws).
194. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-20(C) (2006).
195. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-45-103(2)(a)(i) (2007).
196. See generally Schlein, supra note 80, at 311-13 (2009) (expressing concern about the use of an
individuals' genetic information by employers).

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 12:267

genetic makeup all become issues when workers, employers, or insurers seek to use
biomarkers in making workers' compensation decisions. 197 Workers, employers,
and legislatures must consider these potential issues now in order to make informed
decisions when toxicogenomic technologies are in fact used, and potentially
98
misused, in the employment setting. 1
A. Will Toxicogenomics Revive Notions of Faultand Risk Assumption in
Workers' Compensation?
Workers' compensation is different from most other types of insurance and
therefore creates unique policy and ethical questions surrounding the use of genetic
information.' 99 Many of these questions stem from the fact that employers "take
their employees as they find them" in terms of coverage for work-related
injuries. 20 0 Many of the propositions discussed in this Comment, especially the
potential use of predictive genomic tests to reduce insurance premiums and limit
exposure to accidents, necessarily means that an employer no longer accepts an
employee as they come, but conversely screens individuals for any risky condition
to which they may be susceptible. 20 1 As more and more markers for genetic
predispositions are discovered, a large percentage of the workforce could find itself
in a marginalized position, pressed by employers to reveal genetic information
through pre-placement agreement or exams that may then be passed on to workers'
20 2
compensation insurers as a basis for rating and coverage.
The notion that an employer takes its workers as it finds them grows out of
the most important part of the workers' compensation scheme: liability, and

197. See, e.g., Marchant, supra note 4, at 35 (considering the issues raised when a plaintiffs genetic
information is placed into evidence). See also Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d
1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the information revealed by genetic tests is highly sensitive
and therefore implicates privacy interests).
198. See generally MOLLY E. FRENCH & JANE B. MOORE, HARNESSING GENETICS TO PREVENT
DISEASE & IMPROVE HEALTH: A STATE POLICY GUIDE 1 (2003), available at http://genes-rus.uthscsa.edu/resources/genetics/geneticsguide.pdf (discussing the policy implications of the Human
Genome Project).
199. See generally Max Mehlman, Employee/Employer Interactions and Responsibilities with
Special Reference to Genetically Related Sleep Disorders, 5 SLEEP & BREATHING 153, 155-57 (2001)
(discussing the practical policy implications of using genetic information in workers' compensation
claims).
200. See, e.g., Wolf & Kahn, supra note 8, at 19 ("The long-standing rule governing compensation
for workplace injury or illness is that employers take workers as they find them, including the workers'
vulnerability.").
201. See id. at 154 (explaining genetic screening by employers).
202. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 52-53; see NAT'L COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INS., supra note 138
(granting insurance companies wide latitude in gathering any information needed to determine
eligibility).
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compensation, regardless of fault. 20 3 Workers receive compensation regardless of
why the accident happened.20 4 The absence of a fault requirement also nullifies the
notion that an employee "assumed the risk" by taking a dangerous job and should
therefore be responsible for his or her injuries in the case of an accident. 20 5 The use
of toxicogenomic predictors of susceptibility or predisposition arguably seeks to
inject fault and risk assumption back into the equation.20 6 If employers try to defeat
liability by using genetic tests showing a predilection to developing a workplacerelated injury or disease, the employer essentially is saying that the injury should
not be compensated because the workplace did not cause the injury; put otherwise,
the employer is arguing that it is not at fault.2 07 Furthermore, if testing for genetic
biomarkers becomes more and more accessible to the public, will courts charge
workers with a duty to discover their own genetic predispositions and act
accordingly? If tests are available to determine if a person is susceptible to injury
from a given chemical, will a worker who accepts employment at a factory where
that chemical is processed, and who chose not to have the genetic test, be said to
have assumed the risk? Could employers argue that the employee's own genes
were contributorily negligent in causing the injury? Under the current workers'
compensation structure, arguments based on contributory negligence and risk
assumption would probably be disfavored.20 8
However, workers' compensation was designed at a time when the ability to
discover one's genetic future was not contemplated. 0 9 Perhaps the bargain that was
struck in the late nineteenth century will be adjusted by courts or legislatures to
reflect the changing scientific landscape. 210 The dangers of re-injecting concepts of

203. See Wolf& Kahn, supra note 8, at 18-19 (discussing the origins of workers' compensation law
and efforts to mitigate the effects of the "take the worker as you find him or her" rule).
204. Some states exempt from coverage injuries due to horseplay, intoxication, and other employee
misconduct. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 624-27.
205. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 193 (1916); Jean C. Love, Actions for Nonphysical
Harm: The Relationship Between the Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (with an Emphasis on
Workers' Compensation), 73 CAL. L. REv. 857, 857-58 (1985).
206. See generally NRC Report, supra note 3, at 3 (describing the possible use of toxicogenomics in
predicting future harm).
207. See Robert H. Ashford & William G. Johnson, Negligence vs. No-Fault Liability: An Analysis
of the Workers' Compensation Example, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 725, 730 (1982) (describing how
injuries covered under workers' compensation must derive from work-related injuries). Cf Marchant,
supra note 4, at 12 (discussing the use of genetics to disprove fault in toxic tort cases).
208. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 624-27 (noting that, with some exceptions, workers
receive compensation regardless of why the injury occurred).
209. Compare Gurtler, supra note 1, at 288 (tracing workers' compensation laws to nineteenth
century Germany), with NRC Report, supra note 3, at 22 (placing advancements in gene sequencing
technologies in the 1980s and 1990s).
210. Cf Ashford & Johnson, supra note 207, at 735-36 (noting that in 1972, the National
Commission on State Workers' Compensation Laws recommended changes to workers' compensation
laws to make them more equitable to workers under a no-fault system).
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fault and risk assumption into workers' compensation statutes are significant. 21' As
the number of conditions that can be predicted increases, employers may argue that
these conditions did not arise out of employment.21 2 Assuming that courts accept
this argument, workers who are denied the limited coverage of workers'
compensation and unable to sue in tort would fall back on other insurance systems
or remain uncompensated, in turn shifting the financial burden of workplace illness
to taxpayers.213 Eventually the workers' compensation system could regress to a
system more closely resembling the situation that faced workers before statutory
reform took place more than a century ago.214
Others may argue that forcing the cost of workers' genetic conditions onto the
employer and consumer was not within the original intent of the "bargain".215
Workers' compensation was never intended to be a health care system,2 16 but was
only meant to take care of workers who were injured at work.217 Perhaps it is not
compatible with the original purposes of workers' compensation to award
compensation when an injury is caused by a hard-to-dissect combination of
genetics and environment rather than by a freak accident. 18
B. Will Toxicogenomics Compromise Overall Worker Safety?
Will the threat of liability for illnesses caused in part by genetic
predisposition encourage employers to create a safer work environment? Prior
knowledge about the predispositions of a workforce would give employers the
ability to make narrowly tailored health upgrades to protect its workers.219
However, this specificity might also work as a disservice to overall worker health,
as employers might invest only in those technologies that are most cost beneficial
in that they are likely to prevent the most injuries or illnesses. Alternatively,
employers may feel that, if they have to contend with a myriad of genetic

211. See infra notes 212-214 and accompanying text.
212. See generally Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discriminationin
the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 232 (2000) (describing increasing use of genetic
testing by employers to screen for disease prior to employment).
213. Cf Ashford & Johnson, supra note 207, at 727 (describing programs such as New Zealand's
that create a state-administered insurance program for the injured).
214. Id. at 737-39 (contrasting the common law tort system with the no-fault system of
compensation).
215. See Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 22, at 653-54 (noting that the original intent of workers'
compensation statutes was to provide for workers injured in the workplace and diminish the risk of
injury in the workplace).
216. Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 22, at 655.
217. Id.
218. See Lorie M. Pesonen, Comment, Genetic Screening: An Employer's Tool to Differentiate or to
Discriminate?, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 187, 194 (2002) (discussing the complex genetic
mutations involved with certain diseases).
219. Id. at 190-91.
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conditions in their workforce, improvements to avoid aggravating those conditions
would be futile, especially if they know that workers' compensation boards are
likely to find that such conditions arose out of employment. Employers might find
it cheaper to simply pay higher workers' compensation premiums to cover claims
than to invest in state of the art protective equipment.
C. Can a Compromise Be Reached in the Use of Toxicogenomics to Satisfy
All Parties?
A policy of optional testing for workers contemplating entry into a dangerous
workplace could adequately address the concerns of workers, employers and
insurers.220 Under this model, an employer, aware of the potential for chemical
hazards on the job, could offer all active and potential workers the chance to selfscreen by undergoing free tests for genetic predisposition to disease caused by
conditions or substances present in the workplace.221 Confidentiality would be
maintained by permitting the employee to choose a doctor and laboratory to
conduct the testing, and the results of the test would only be seen by the worker and
the worker's physician.222
Such a system would advance workers' autonomy interests in several ways.
First, workers would decide whether to undergo testing. This choice would
alleviate the issue of exposing a worker, or his or her family, to genetic information
that they would rather not know.223 Should the worker choose to undergo the test,
screening could be limited to only those conditions that might be triggered by the
workplace, therefore protecting the worker from discovering non-work related
genetic conditions.224 Upon receipt of results showing a predisposition, and after
consultation with a genetic counselor, the worker could then choose to decline
employment, or to accept it with full knowledge of the risks, in turn increasing the
likelihood that the worker would take responsibility for using safe work practices,
consequently decreasing the chances of suffering a work injury.225

220. Rothstein, supra note 78, at 394; see NRC Report, supra note 3, at 198 ("The decision to use
toxicogenomic testing to learn about one's individual risk should rest with the individual, including risk
posed by the workplace setting.").
221. See Rothstein, supra note 78, at 394 (describing genetic testing to be used by employees to
decide whether to accept or continue in their positions).
222. See id. (noting that employee testing information would not be available to the employer).
223. See generally R. Andorno, The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J. MED.
ETHICS 435,435-36 (2004) (discussing the right to not know one's own genetic information).
224. See CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., FACT SHEET No. 21, DNA GENETIC TESTING: SCREENING FOR
GENETIC
CONDITIONS
AND
GENETIC
SUSCEPTIBILITY
1
(2007),
available at
http://www.genetics.com.au/pdf/factsheets/fs21 .pdf (defining "genetic screening" and "genetic testing"
as evaluations completed for particularconditions).
225. See id. (stating that employees would be free to decide whether to continue in their present
positions after undergoing testing).
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Employers would benefit from voluntary testing for many of the same reasons
as employees: self-screening and increased attention to safety would likely decrease
the number of illnesses.226 The lower number of illnesses would benefit employers
most obviously in decreasing reported workers' compensation claims, thus
positively affecting the employer's experience rating.227 An employer that had a
voluntary testing program would also probably be favored by insurance carriers,
because a fair percentage of susceptible workers would likely choose not to accept
employment, thus decreasing the pool of high-risk individuals. 228 Also, insurance
companies would look favorably upon companies whose workers, aware of their
genetic susceptibility, utilize safer work practices. 229 An added bonus for an
employer under a voluntary testing model would be good press: 230 the employer
could advertise its workplace as one respectful of workers' privacy and concerned
for worker safety-two claims that could be a valuable selling point as genetic
23 1
testing becomes increasingly used by employers.
Workers' compensation insurers would also benefit from optional genetic
testing. Upon insuring a company that offered testing, an insurer could feel secure
that it was underwriting a calculable risk.232 Though under current rating rules
insurers probably could not initially offer a monetary benefit to employers for
offering optional testing,233 simply knowing that the worker population at such a
company was self-screened to remove some of the most susceptible workers might

226. Clair Andre & Manuel Valasquez, Read My Genes: Genetic Screening in the Workplace,
ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1991, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v4n2/genes.html.

227. See Spieler, supra note 124, at 192-93 (explaining that employers with fewer workers'
compensation claims have better experience ratings).
228. Id. Cf Crimcheck.com, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: The Guide to a Risk
Management and Violence Program Success, http://www.crimcheck.com/background-check/employeescreening.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (describing how a strong pre-employment screening process
that emphasizes non-violence can reduce the presence of violent employees).
229. See, e.g., Spieler, supra note 124, at 192-93 (noting that safer workplaces receive more
favorable insurance ratings in the area of workers' compensation).
230. Cf Laura Sullivan, Corporate Wellness: A Healthy Return on Employee Investment,
ALLBUStNESS.COM, Nov. 1, 2003, http://www.allbusiness.com/operations/business-insurance-riskmanagement/I 104312-1.html (describing how a voluntary corporate wellness program generated
positive publicity for an employer).
231. See Press Release, TRUSTe, Ponemon Institute and TRUSTe Rank America's Most Trusted
Companies in Privacy (Sept. 16, 2009), available at http://www.truste.com/aboutTRUSTe/pressroom/newstruste_2009_mosttrustedcompaniesjforprivacy.html (awarding companies based on the
strength
of
their
privacy
policies);
EHSToday,
America's
Safest
Companies,
http://ehstoday.com/safety/asc/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (awarding companies based on their safety
practices).
232. See NRC Report, supra note 3, at II (noting that genetic testing has the potential to improve
risk assessment).
233. See Spieler, supra note 124, at 192 (explaining that insurers determine the rating of particular
employers based on a three-year period).
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make an insurer more likely to underwrite that company's coverage. 234 This might
save some employers from being forced into the assigned risk pool, which comes
with much higher premiums. 235 If self-screening and targeted safety measures
resulted in fewer workers' compensation claims overall, insurers would pay out
less in claims and would keep a larger percentage of the premiums paid for
policies. 36
Those who think that employers should have unfettered access to genetic
information or, conversely, who think genetic information should have no place in
employment decisions, are likely to point out the issues that remain even with a
moderate approach like optional testing. One likely area of criticism is the accuracy
and usefulness of new toxicogenomic technologies. 237 Given the relatively new
means of determining worker susceptibility to toxins, toxicogenomics must go
through a validation process to establish its reliability. 238 Also, as with any genetic
test, the results are a prediction of an interaction between an individual's genetic
material and a particular toxin. 239 The actual occurrence of such a reaction is not
guaranteed by a positive genetic test, and raises the question of whether workers
will limit themselves from certain employment that might never have negatively
affected their health. 40 Some may also argue that encouraging voluntary testing
will encourage employers to focus their accident prevention resources on those
illnesses that have known results based on chemicals that are present in the
workplace, and as a result will sacrifice overall worker health. 24' Finally, some
opponents might question the cost and logistics of encouraging potential employees
to undergo toxicogenomic testing. 2442 The cost of genetic testing might be
worthwhile to an employer as it would likely lower workers' compensation

234. See id. at 192 (explaining that safer companies with fewer workers' compensation claims are
rated lower by insurance providers).
235. See, e.g., Wis. Comp. Rating Bureau, Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.wcrb.org/
WCRB/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.asp#ass6 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (noting that employers in the
assigned risk pool are not entitled to premium discounts, as are employers in the voluntary market).
236. For a general discussion of workers' compensation insurance, see John W. Ruser, Workers'
Compensation Insurance, Experience-Rating, and Occupational Injuries, 16 RAND J. ECON. 487
(1985).
237. See Rothstein, supra note 78, at 394 (noting that a threshold issue in genetic testing in the
workplace is whether testing has sufficient clinical and analytical utility to be used for screening
purposes).
238. NRC Report, supra note 3, at 135.
239. See id. at 12 (explaining that toxicogenomics can provide information on genetic-environment
interactions).
240. See generally id. at 95 (stating that the results of toxicogenomic tests are often counterintuitive
and uncertain).
241. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 78, at 401 (describing how allowing employers to exclude
workers who are genetically predisposed to occupational diseases would eliminate incentives to clean up
the employers' overall workplace).
242. Id. at 394-95.
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premiums and reduce employee turnover.243 To protect confidentiality, referrals for
testing and counseling could be handled by a third party provider, much like
current employee assistance programs. 2 " Clearly, the logistics of a system of
voluntary employee testing have yet to be worked out, but between the two
extremes, this moderate approach provides a workable and realistic framework that
could satisfy all parties' concerns.
CONCLUSION

For over a century, workers' compensation statutes have maintained a balance
between workers, employers, and insurers.245 While toxicogenomics has the
potential to alter the essential ingredients of the "bargain", such a result is not
assured.246 The present statutory trend seems to be toward greater protection of
genetic information,247 and may signal the direction legislatures will take in the
future with regard to the use of genetic testing in workers' compensation
insurance. 24 In the absence of legislation, workers, employers, and insurers
themselves can control the degree to which toxicogenomics reworks the "bargain"
by the policies and procedures they choose to adopt. 249 Ultimately, how genetic
information will or will not be used in workers' compensation underwriting and
claims will be a policy decision and a compromise, just as the original workers'
compensation statutes were. 250

243. See Spicier, supra note 124, at 192-93 (explaining that employers with fewer workers'
compensation claims pay less for insurance).
244. See Diana Chapman Walsh, Employee Assistance Programs, 60 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.
HEALTH & Soc'y 492, 503 (1982) (noting the common belief that employee assistance programs
conducted by outside medical departments, rather than internal personnel, show a higher degree of
respect for employee confidentiality).
245. Gurtler, supra note 1, at 288; Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 22, at 653.
246. See NRC Report, supra note 3, at II ("As biologic knowledge progresses with the science of
toxicology, 'toxicogenomics' ... has the potential to improve risk assessment and hazard screening.")
247. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 111.372(4)(a) (2006) (requiring informed, written consent of the
employee before genetic information is used to investigate workers' compensation claims).
248. See generally Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 189, 194 (1998) (discussing the need for further legal protections against the use of genetic
information by employers).
249. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (limiting
the use of genetic information by employers, not by employees); Rothstein, supra note 78, at 399
(explaining that without specific statutory requirements, employers may choose whether to conduct
medical examinations of employees); Wolf & Kahn, supra note 8, at 6 (noting there is no statutory
prohibition against insurers using genetic information in workers' compensation underwriting).
250. See Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 22, at 653 (discussing the compromise between employers
and employees that characterized the first workers' compensation statutes).

